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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
DAMAGES
Attorney's Fees. In Wells v. Aetna Insurance Co.' the Washington
court indicated an increasing friendliness toward the allowance of
attorney's fees as damages. The plaintiff, Wells, had purchased a car
from a used car dealer. The dealer had earlier made what the court
called a "fictitious" sale to someone else, and had then assigned the
conditional sales contract to a financing company, Hayden Mills &
Associates, Inc. Apparently there was a record of this sale at the
state license department, but no valid release was on file there. So
when Wells applied for a new registration and a new title certificate,
these were initially granted and later cancelled. Unable to get a license
for the car he had purchased, and unable to sell it, Wells brought an
action to quiet title, naming as defendants the dealer, the alleged pur-
chaser, the alleged assignee of the conditional sales contract, and Aetna
Insurance Co., which was the surety on the bond required of automo-
bile dealers by RCW 46.70.070.2
At this point the procedure became somewhat involved. According
to the court, Hayden Mills and Associates, Inc., the assignee of the
prior conditional sales contract, "cross-complained" against the other
defendants, and Aetna "interpleaded" plaintiff Wells and Hayden
Mills.
Sometime during trial plaintiff amended his complaint to ask for
$800 attorney's fees. These were allowed, and Aetna appealed from
that portion of the judgment only.
The court held that Aetna, the surety, was liable to plaintiff for the
$800:
Plaintiffs were required to defend their right to the automobile against
the claim asserted in the cross-complaint of Hayden Mills & Associates,
Inc., as well as in the interpleader action of defendant. For this, they
are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. The fees are a loss occasioned
be the action of the wrongdoer. 3
The court did not stop there, however, but added:
1 160 Wash. Dec. 884, 376 P.2d 644 (1962).
2 "Before issuing a dealer license, the director shall require the applicant to file
with said director a surety bond in the amount of ten thousand dollars for automobile
dealers and two thousand dollars for miscellaneous dealers running to the state. Such
bond shall be approved by the attorney general as to form and conditioned that the
dealer shall conduct his business in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.
Any retail purchaser who shall have suffered any loss or damage by reason of
breach of warranty or by any act by a dealer which constitutes a violation of this
chapter shall have the right to institute an action for recovery against such dealer
and the surety upon such bond .. "
3160 Wash. Dec. at 887, 376 P.2d at 645.
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We believe it apparent from the history of RCW 46.70.070... that the
surety on the bond of a "double-dealing" motor vehicle dealer is liable
for the loss resulting from the perfidy of the principal....4
There are, therefore, two independent grounds for the decision,
either one of which would have been adequate. The first ground is
the well-recognized rule that one who wrongfully involves another in
litigation with a third party must pay the attorney's fees incurred in
that litigation. The second ground is that the language of the statute
requiring the surety to respond for "any loss or damage" authorizes
the assessment of attorney's fees incurred in the instant action against
the surety.
It is conceivable the the third-party litigation rule would justify the
result in this case, but not by the reasoning which the court uses. The
court states the rule in this fashion:
[W] hen the natural and proximate consequences of a wrongful act by -
the defendant involve the plaintiff in litigation with others, there may,
as a general rule, be a recovery of damages for the resonable expenses.
incurred in the litigation, including compensation for attorney's fees.5
According to the cases and other authorities, the wrongful act of
the defendant which forces the plaintiff into litigation with others can
be a tort,' or a breach of contract,7 or the breach of a fiduciary duty
like that which an agent owes to his prinicpal.8 One so involved in
litigation would normally be a defendant, but one who is forced to
initiate litigation may still recover from the wrongdoer the attorney's
fees incurred in that action.' The attorney's fees recoverable are not
limited to fees for trial only, but include the costs of investigation and
preparation, even where there is an eventual settlement."
There are some limitations upon the application of the rule. The
litigation with the third party must have been entered into or defended
in good faith.1 The act of the defendant which involved the plaintiff
4 Id. at 887, 376 P2d at 646.
Id. at 887, 376 P.2d at 645.8 Seaboard Surety Co. v. Permacrete Constr. Corp., 221 F.2d 366 (3rd Cir. 1955);
Turner v. Zip Motors Inc., 245 Iowa 1091, 65 N.W2d 427 (1954) ; Prior Lake State
Bank v. Groth, 259 Minn. 495, 108 N.W.2d 619 (1961); RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 914
(1939).
7 Freed v. The Travelers, 300 F2d 395 (7th Cir. 1962); Longview School Dist
No. 112 v. Stubbs Electric Co., 160 Wash. 465, 295 Pac. 186 (1931); Murphy v.
Fidelity Abstract & Title Co., 114 Wash. 77, 194 Pac. 591 (1921) ; Curtley v. Security
Savings Society, 46 Wash. 50, 89 Pac. 180 (1907) ; RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs J 334
(1932); 5 CORB IN, CoNTRAc-s § 1037 (1951).
8 Tarnowski v. Resop, 236 Minn. 33, 51 N.W.2d 801 (1952).
9 Bergquist v. Kreidler, 158 Minn. 127, 196 N.W. 964 (1924) ; Hiss v. Friedberg,
201 Va. 572, 112 S.E2d 871 (1960).
10 Seaboard Surety Co. v. Permacrete Constr. Corp., 221 F2d 366 (3rd Cir. 1955).
11 Indiana Nat'l Life Insurance Co. v. Butler, 186 Ky. 81, 215 S.W. 949 (1919).
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in litigation must have been a legal wrong to the plaintiff; an innocent
act is not sufficient." Finally, there must have been a causal connection
between the defendant's wrong to the plaintiff and the litigation in
which the plaintiff became involved. In a Washington case the de-
fendant had sold to the plaintiff logs which later turned out to be
subject to liens. Both plaintiff and defendant were involved in the suit
to foreclose the liens. Plaintiff was not allowed to recover fees from
defendant because defendant was adequately defending the title to the
logs. Plaintiff's only reason for being a party was to cross-claim
against defendant, so his attorney's fees were not caused by defendant's
wrong."
In explaining why it applied the third-party litigation rule in the
Wells case, the Washington court emphasized that the plaintiff was
forced to defend against a cross-claim made by one defendant against
another defendant, and was required to interplead. Clearly, the rule
as described above would not apply to either of these situations, since
a plaintiff is not even involved in a cross-claim between one defendant
and another defendant; and one required to interplead, if that is
indeed what happened, is not forced into litigation by the wrongful act
of the defendant.
The third-party litigation rule might apply on the facts of this
case: A wrongful act of the defendant, namely, breach of an implied
warranty of title as to plaintiff, involved plaintiff in litigation with
others because he was forced to bring the action to quiet title against
the purported vendee in the earlier "sale" and against the purported
assignee of the earlier conditional sales contract. For the plaintiff to
prevail, however, it would be necessary to establish that there has been
a breach of warranty of title where a purchaser of an automobile has
had difficulty in procuring certificates of registration and title from
the department of licenses, even though a court finally decided that
the purchaser did have title. Presumably, this proposition could be
established, 4 but no such argument was attempted in the Wells case.
Perhaps realizing that it was somewhat questionable whether the
third-party litigation rule would apply here, the court implied that the
language of the statute requiring a bond for motor vehicle dealers"
12 Dwarsky v. Vermes Credit Jewelry, 244 Minn. 62, 69 N.W.2d 118 (1955).
13 Atkinson v. McCarthy, 142 Wash. 1, 251 Pac. 861 (1927).
14 In White v. Mid-City Motor Co., 39 Tenn. App. 429, 284 S.W.2d 689 (1955) a
car buyer was allowed to rescind because the dealer had breached the warranty of
title in not delivering a title certificate at the time of the sale.
15 For text of statute see note 2 supra.
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authorizes assessment of attorney's fees, at least against the surety.
Should the court choose to follow this line of reasoning in the future, it
would bring about a significant change in the law.
It is well settled in Washington, as in the rest of the United States,
that the successful litigant cannot generally recover for the actual
attorney's fees which he has incurred, except to the extent that they are
allowed by the statute on costs.' From previous Washington cases it
also appears that the court has been unwilling to read into a statute
allowing "damages" to the successful party the intent to allow actual
attorney's fees, where that intent is not expressly stated. In Percy v.
Miller' an administrator brought an action under what is now RCW
11.48.060. This provides that a person who embezzles or alienates
property of a decedent before letters of administration are granted,
"shall stand chargeable, and be liable to the executor or administrator
of the estate, in the value of the property so embezzled or alienated,
together with any damages occasioned thereby." The court held that
this statute did not render the defendant liable to the administrator for
attorney's fees incurred in the action to recover alienated funds. The
language of the court specifically denies that the statute might auth-
orize attorney's fees:
The statute relating to costs and disbursements in itself provides what '
may be, recovered under these heads in the particular action. This.
includes a limited attorney's fee, and is all that can be 'recovered as
attorney's fees unless the statute expressly allows an additional re-
covery.'8
This view has been affirmed in actions under the mandamus statute,
RCW 7.16.260, which provides: "If judgment be given for the appli-
cant he may recover the damages which he has sustained .... " In
State ex. rel. Macri v. Bremerton9 the court held that this statute did
not authorize assessment of attorney's fees, saying, "in absence of
contract, statute, or recognized ground of equity, a court has no power
to award an attorney's fee as part of the costs of litigation.
20
Other courts are divided as to whether a right to "damages" or
similar language when given by statute allows assessment of attorney's
1 oChoukas v. Severyns, 3 Wn2d 71, 103 P2d 1106 (1940) ; Johnston v. Karkala,
172 Wash. 122, 19 P2d 948 (1933) ; McCoamcx, DAMAGES §§ 60, 61 (1935). There
are of course other exceptions such as contract between the parties, or allowance out
of a common fund, but these are outside the scope of this note.
1'115 Wash. 440, 197 Pac. 638 (1921).
18 Id. at 447, 197 Pac. at 641.
108 Wn.2d 93, 111 P.2d 612 (1941).
20Id. at 113, 111 P2d at 621. Accord, State ex rel. Pacific Bridge Co. v. Wash-
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fees. Kansas,2 Montana,22 and Utah" interpret their mandamus
statutes, which are quite similar to that in Washington, as allowing
attorney's fees incurred in bringing the action. South Dakota24 on the
other hand, agrees with Washington as to the mandamus statute, the
court of that state saying:
We feel that if it had been the desire of the legislature to provide for
attorney fees in this statute, that in addition to using the word damages,
it undoubtedly would have used the term attorney fees.23
Some states have a mortgage satisfaction statute which provides that
a mortgagee who refuses to enter satisfaction of a mortgage is liable to
the mortgagor for "damages." Both Idaho26 and Utah" have construed
this statute as allowing attorney's fees. However, Arizona, under a
statute allowing a suit against state officers for wrongful application
of state funds, and allowing a successful plaintiff "all damages," has
held that the statute does not authorize attorney's fees.2
If the Wells case indicates that the Washington court henceforth is
going to read statutes allowing "damages" liberally, as allowing attor-
ney's fees, the question arises how far the court will go. It might, of
course, allow attorney's fees as damages in every civil action, whether
brought under statute or not. If a litigant is given attorney's fees where
the statute allows him "damages," why should he not be allowed
attorney's fees when the common law allows him damages? 9
The most limited view would be to restrict the allowance of attor-
ney's fees to actions arising under statutes which have language
identical to that employed in RCW 46.70.070, which uses the words,
"any loss or damage." There are two other such statutes in Washing-
ton."o Such a limitation would be unfortunate, and would be unreason-
able for two reasons. First, the variety of language used in other
ington Toll Bridge Authority, 8 Wn.2d 337, 112 P.2d 135 (1941) ; State ex rel.
Maltbie v. Will, 54 Wash. 453, 104 Pac. 797 (1909).
21 Nolte v. Kansas City Long-Distance Tel. Co., 86 Kan. 770, 121 Pac. 1111 (1912).
22 State ex rel. O'Sullivan v. District Court, 127 Mont. 32, 256 P.2d 1076 (1953).
23 Colorado Development Co. v. Creer, 96 Utah 1, 80 P.2d 914 (1938).
24 Calmenson Clothing Co. v. Kruger, 66 S.D. 224, 281 N.W. 203 (1938).
25 Id. at 206.26 Cornelison v. United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 50 Idaho 1, 292 Pac. 243 (1930).
27 Swaner v. Union Mortgage Co., 99 Utah 298, 105 P.2d 342 (1940).
28 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Frohmiller, 71 Ariz. 377, 227 P.2d 1007 (1951).
20 This is not an altogether frivolous suggestion, since respected writers have been
sniping at the injustice and undesirable consequences of the present system for some
time. See, for example, McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES § 71 (1935); Ehrenzweig, Shall
Counsel Fees be Allowed? 26 J. STATE BAR OF CAL. 107 (1951) ; Geller, Unreasonable
Refusal to Settle and Calendar Congestion--Suggested Remedy 34 N.Y. ST. BAR J.
477 (1962) ; Note, 15 U. CiNc. L. Rxv. 313 (1941) ; and sources therein cited.
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Washington statutes which give a right to recover against an individual,
or a surety, indicates that the choice of words in the instant statute
was purely fortuitous."' Nothing should turn on the fact that the
statute here in question uses the words "any loss" as an alternative to
"damage." Second, even if the legislature did intentionally use the
word "loss" disjunctively with "damage," it was merely being redund-
ant, as is the court when it uses the familiar words, "clear, cogent and
convincing." That damages and loss mean the same was early recogn-
ized by the Washington court. Three opinions, all written by Justice
Gose, state substantially the same thing: "'Damages,' in law, means
an adequate compensation for the loss suffered or the injury sus-
tained."3 2 The Pennsylvania court has also recognized the identity of
meaning in the two words, saying, "These words, 'damage,' 'loss,'
'injury' are used interchangeably, not simply in this particular statute,
but generally." 3 The language of the statute ought not, therefore, to be
used as the basis for limiting the operation of the rule that attorney's
fees are authorized where a statute gives a right to damages.
What, then, will be the limitation? The obvious and most workabl6
one would be to allow attorney's fees in any instance in which a statute
gives a right to "damages," regardless of qualifying words. Since there
are a number of such statutes in Washington, 4 this would be a major
step toward eliminating what many think are inequalities in the present
system. The Wells case provides the Washington court with a pre-
cedent which it can use to expand greatly the range of cases in which
the prevailing litigant may be allowed his actual attorney's fees.
Whether it will be so used must depend ultimately upon a policy de-
cision by the court that such a rule would be desirable.
ROBERT L. BEALE
30RCW 14.20.070 (aircraft dealers' licenses); RCW 46.80.070 (motor vehicle
wreckers).
3 1 RCW 5.56.060 (compelling attendance of witnesses) ("all damages occasioned");
RCW Z16260 (mandamus) and 7.16.320 (prohibition) ("damages which he has
sustained") ; RCW 11.48.060 (interfering with property of a decedent) ("any dam-
age occasioned thereby"); RCW 16.65.250 (livestock market licensee) ("damages
caused by failure to comply"); RCW 17.21.160-.180 (pesticide applicators) ("legal
damages") ; RCW 18.12.110 (auctioneers of jewelry and appliances) ("all damages") ;
RCW 1928.120 (electric installers) ("all damages that may be sustained") ; RCW
19.86.090 (consumer protection) ("actual damages sustained") ; RCW 19.90.090 (un-
fair practices) ("actual damages, if any, sustained") ; RCW 20.01.210-230 (commis-
sion merchants) ("damages caused by such fraud") ; RCW 22.08.170-.180 (grain and
terminal warehouses) ("all damages suffered thereby").3
2 North Coast Ry. Co. v. Kraft Co., 63 Wash. 250, 262, 115 Pac. 97, 102 (1911).
Accord, Myhra v. Chicago, Milwaukee and Puget Sound Ry. Co., 62 Wash. 1, 112
Pac. 939 (1911). Jones v. Nelson, 61 Wash. 167, 112 Pac. 88 (1910).
33 In re City of Pittsburgh, 243 Pa. 392, 90 AtI. 329, 331 (1914).
84 See notes 30 and 31 supra for a list of these statutes.
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